With the joint statement of the American and French presidents, and British Prime Minister, the military operations in Libya appear, without any debate on this issue in the Parliament of these three countries, to be entering a new phase: it is no longer a question of protecting civilian lives at risk, as required by Resolution Number 1973 of the UN Security Council, but to get rid of Gadhafi. This strategy however, reaffirmed in Doha by Heads of State of the coalition, does not seem to be unanimous: the leaders of India, Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa, gathered in Sanya, China (in a  historic meeting because it is the first manifestation of a coherent strategic intent of these five countries representing half of the population of the planet) were strongly opposed to it. And even the foreign ministers of NATO countries, meeting in Berlin, remained reluctant. The Americans themselves do not seem enthusiastic and have withdrawn about 50 fighter-bombers which were in operation; few countries are rushing to replace them. Only London and Paris really advocate the intensification of air operations.

Even if we get to continue these operations, they will not be enough: without action on the ground, it is unlikely that the insurgents could overthrow Gadhafi, or even save the fragile independence of the region of Benghazi. In fact, the National Transitional Council, a body of command of the rebels, is requesting from the coalition a supply of weapons, to conduct their ground combat; some countries, more or less discreetly, are already committed. This is understandable: it is in the logic of committed action, to the dismay of those responsible for budgets, under the combined pressure from journalists, diplomats, the military and arms dealers.

They forget the lessons of the past: in Afghanistan, weapons supplied by Washington to help the Taliban in their fight against Moscow were turned against the Americans as soon as the Soviet troops were defeated. Already, we see rushing into Libya, on both sides, volunteer fighters, whose only interest is precisely to obtain weapons and become hardened for other battles.

This spiral is not unique to Libya. We find it in other countries. For example, in Ivory Coast, where weapons distributed to combatants on both sides are now going to get lost in the middle of nowhere and find themselves in the most diverse hands, in particular in those of the groups of AQMI (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), in Mauritania, Mali, Chad and elsewhere. They will also be found wherever peoples will fail to free themselves alone from a dictator.

More generally, when toothpaste is out of the tube, it is impossible to get it back in. So we should not supply weapons to unreliable groups. But as we obviously cannot hope to win this war simply with air strikes, or stop doing so to resolve to come back later to bomb Gadhafi’s forces whenever they will regain ground, we should, logically, send Western troops on the ground to win this battle. Impossible? Obviously! There is no solution? No, there is none. And we should have thought about it before.