We hear all sorts of things about this campaign because we’re not putting ourselves in the actual situation of June 2027:
A new president is elected; he dissolves the National Assembly and secures a majority. Can he implement the platform that every candidate is talking about today? The answer is simple: No. No matter who the candidate is or what the platform is. Because he’ll need money—and legal approval. He’ll have neither. It’s about time we realized that.
Money? No.
By early summer 2027, the budget for the current year (which will likely have been enacted through the undemocratic procedure of executive orders, never used before) will have spiraled largely out of control, and preparations will need to be made for the following year’s budget, which must incorporate the newly elected president’s commitments. Lowering the retirement age to 62, or even 60, would cost between 15 and more than 30 billion euros per year, even as the pension system is already structurally in deficit and the number of contributors per retiree continues to decline. Lowering the VAT—or eliminating it on basic necessities or energy—would result in revenue losses of several billion per percentage point. Massively increasing funding for schools and hospitals, raising the salaries of teachers and healthcare workers, and hiring tens of thousands of civil servants: each of these measures, while absolutely justified in and of itself, amounts to tens of billions. And on top of that, we’ll have to pay for the growing debt burden. Where will this money come from?
No candidate offers a serious answer to this question: Combating tax and social security fraud is necessary, but it certainly won’t be enough to generate the tens of billions in additional revenue projected in some estimates by 2028. Taxing the wealthiest is based on the same accounting illusion: the largest fortunes are liquid, largely composed of shares in unlisted or professional firms, and their actual tax yield is always much lower than announced. Even if it’s unfair, it’s a fact. As for administrative savings—cited by all candidates but never achieved by any president—they can realistically only apply to pensions, health insurance, social benefits, and public employee compensation. Who is proposing to cut these? No one.
A constitutional green light? No.
Other eagerly awaited reforms will run up against other insurmountable obstacles: Massively reducing benefits paid to legally resident foreigners and establishing a “national preference” in access to housing or social assistance are proposals that run counter to the principle of equality enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and in the 1946 Preamble.
Organizing expedited and mass deportations runs up against the right to asylum, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the courts.
To implement all these reforms, the new administration would therefore have to initiate a constitutional amendment. And here, we face two further impasses:
If it seeks to do so via the referendum provided for in Article 11, as General de Gaulle did in 1962, it will run up against the Constitutional Council’s consistent interpretation that amending the Constitution falls exclusively under Article 89. Let us imagine that the new government disregards this and organizes this referendum on the very day of the June legislative elections, distributing “yes” and “no” ballots at the same time as the ballots for the candidates. In this situation, the Constitutional Council would reiterate its opposition to this interpretation of Article 11 and annul the decree calling voters to the polls for this referendum. The mayors, responsible for organizing the vote, would then have to choose between following the Interior Minister’s directive or complying with the Constitutional Council’s decision, which is binding on all administrative authorities under Article 62 of the Constitution. And since at least some of the mayors will remain committed to the rule of law and respect the Council’s decision, this referendum will fail.
The new administration could then proceed under Article 89. However, this requires that the proposed amendment be adopted in identical terms by both the National Assembly and the Senate, before being ratified by referendum or by Congress with a three-fifths majority. Yet the Senate, elected by indirect suffrage and with half its members up for reelection each term, will not see its majority shift simply because of the presidential election. None of the radical proposals currently on the table would win its approval, unless it were to bring shame upon itself, as French parliamentarians did in 1940. In other words, constitutional reform is impossible.
Similarly, unilaterally and drastically reducing France’s contribution to the European Union budget—which amounts to less than twenty billion euros per year—is impossible: this contribution stems from the decision on own resources and the multiannual financial framework, both of which were adopted unanimously and ratified by France. To renege on this would amount to violating the treaties and triggering a crisis with our partners, who have numerous means of retaliation at their disposal, especially against a country on the brink of bankruptcy. We may regret it, but that is the reality.
These are obvious facts that all citizens should be aware of: Neither the state of public finances, nor the Constitution, nor the treaties will allow us to keep the promises currently being made to them.
This observation is not a call for fatalism. It is a call for clarity. A candidate who were to explain that the primary task of the next five-year term will be to finally balance the budget (as should have been done for at least 20 years) rather than handing out what the country no longer has would be taking a major electoral risk. But the candidates who conceal this fact are setting the stage for massive disillusionment, of which democracy will be the first victim.