In 2002 (24 years ago), the broad outlines of the world in 2026 could be discerned from gradual trends; yet we failed to take them into account at all. Today, too, we can foresee what might happen in 24 years (that is, in 2050), and we risk failing to take that into account as well.
A serious observer could have predicted in 2002 the main features of 2026: a China that had become the world’s factory and then a rival to the United States; economies dependent on digital technology; a warming climate; a fragile eurozone due to the lack of fiscal union; an aging France; declining birth rates; and regions transformed into deserts. These trends were rooted in structures that evolve slowly and are perfectly predictable: in 2002, French people in their forties had already been born; today’s retirees were already in the workforce; and the challenges of an aging population and pensions had already been addressed in countless reports. Admittedly, no one could have foreseen at the time the 2008 crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, or generative artificial intelligence; but anyone who wanted to could have found in numerous books (including my *Dictionary of the 21st Century*, published in late 1999) predictions of the widespread adoption of smartphones and social media, the possibility of major advances in internet search algorithms, a global pandemic, a financial crisis, and a massive terrorist attack.
And in 2050? Many developments are foreseeable, and we would do well to take them into account right away: the workforce of 2050 already exists, give or take migration; population shifts toward cities will have accelerated; AI will have revolutionized every profession; robotics will be everywhere; China will have become, on par with the United States, the world’s leading power; India, Nigeria, Morocco, and Côte d’Ivoire will be experiencing explosive growth; the climate will have settled permanently at a “normal” level that resembles what we currently consider an exception; and countless wars—perfectly predictable today—will have taken place.
In France, in the worst-case scenario, the fertility rate will have reached Italian and Spanish levels (1.2 to 1.3); immigration, regardless of its scale, will only modestly rejuvenate the age structure, since migrants are aging as well; and if nothing has been done to integrate them properly and defend secularism, they will be violently rejected; the population will decline; the ratio of workers to retirees, currently close to 1.7, will fall to around 1.3, with rural areas and medium-sized cities facing long-term depopulation. Despite this demographic decline, structural unemployment will take hold due to the automation of services, reaching 10 to 12 percent overall and more than 25 percent among young people; taxes and social contributions will reach 48% of GDP. Pensions, healthcare, long-term care, climate adaptation, rearmament, and the energy transition will remain the top areas of spending, along with public debt (which will tend toward the deficit divided by nominal growth—at best, 140%); interest on the debt will cost between 6% and 8% of GDP, or three times the current level.
All of this will unfold very quickly: if, by 2027, a majority does not emerge that is clearly determined to finally bring debt under control and to reform education and the tax burden, interest rates will rise and the interest burden will crowd out investment; the government will raise taxes and cut benefits, which will weigh on growth and fuel unemployment; revenues will decline, the deficit will widen, and debt will spiral out of control.
Well before 2050, Germany will be called upon to come to the rescue and will refuse any form of risk-sharing: it will suffer from so many structural weaknesses (an aging population, an industry under pressure) and will face so many difficult trade-offs, under pressure from its far right, that its relationship with France will no longer be a priority; it will rearm itself alongside Poland, the Nordic countries, and Washington rather than with Paris; or it will draw closer to Russia. France will have to face the markets without the support of the ECB. A very harsh adjustment program (with household savings forcibly redirected toward financing public debt) will be imposed from outside. Let us not think that nuclear deterrence and our commercial, monetary, and border interdependence with our neighbors will protect France from such a catastrophe.
None of this is inevitable, provided we clearly visualize this scenario and are determined to pursue a different one.
France has substantial savings, nuclear energy, an industry and agriculture that remain exceptional, a rule of law that is generally respected, and a historical capacity for adjustment (as demonstrated in 1983 and 2010); it has room to significantly increase its average work hours and to prioritize the economy of daily life. And even its demographics can improve if a genuine housing policy is implemented quickly.
If we view the period from 2000 to 2050 as a soccer game, we’re only at halftime. At the start of the game, we could have predicted the challenges of the first half fairly accurately—and taken them into account to adjust our strategy. We didn’t do that. And now we’re down two goals to zero. For the second half, we must be neither optimistic nor pessimistic, because we’re players on the field, not spectators in this game—a game we can still win. So the right question isn’t “What will have become of us by 2050?” but “How can we play the second half better to win the match?”
Everything will be decided in the first few months of the next five-year term. If we don’t act very quickly, we’ll concede a few more goals and we won’t be able to avoid a crushing defeat.
Drafting a “France 2050 Plan” should have been the first task of the outgoing five-year term; implementing it should have been the guiding principle of its actions. Which candidate for 2027 will make this the guiding principle of their platform?