British Prime Minister David Cameron, by asking to renegotiate the European Union Treaty, before giving Britons a straight referendum choice on whether to stay in the European Union or leave, is applying Groucho Marx’s famous dictum: “I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member.”
As surrealistic as it sounds, this request is first of all a manoeuvre of domestic policy: the British right wing is about to implode: the Conservative Party is now comprised of two leanings, strongly hostile to each other: one who is pro-European (to which Cameron belongs), and the other nationalist (in the image of the American Tea Party). And it is an attempt to
maintain a facade of unity between these two factions, and to reduce his unpopularity that Cameron has made this proposal.
In doing so, he hopes to provide an outlet for all those who, in Great Britain, regard the European Union as a kind of bureaucratic dictatorship, with detailed and pervasive regulation.
This proposal may appear clever: no one can be opposed to a referendum and the Labor Party will be forced to endorse it, not wanting to appear as lacking faith in voters. And Cameron, applying the doctrine that has proven so successful to the British since the 18th century, (divide the other Europeans), will be hoping to obtain from the other Europeans one or two concessions, which will allow him to win the next parliamentary elections and the referendum that will follow.
In reality, this proposal is very dangerous: other countries could step into the breach and ask, they also, for special statutes. Already, political parties in Sweden and Italy seem tempted; and others will follow; even in France. It would be the end of the European Union, which cannot be a collection of tailor made bilateral agreements, with no solidarity.
France and Germany therefore must respond as quickly as possible, by showing a united front: renegotiate the Treaties, so the Union may progress, of course: this is done every day, and this will be necessary anyway, for the implementation of a monetary union. But to grant a special status to Great Britain or any other country, no way. Anyone wanting to obtain a special status will first have to leave the Union and then negotiate an association status. This must be clearly stated, and must provide an absolute dividing-line.
In order to impose this line, France must know and make it known that the exit of Great Britain would be very sad (in view of the role of this country in the history of Europe, and especially in the victory against totalitarian powers, that gave birth to the European project), but that this exit would be much less tragic than keeping Great Britain in the Union with a special status, exempt from all controls, of a country becoming increasingly every day the main place for money laundering in the world, and which stubbornly undermines progress in the construction of the European Union, and even that of the Eurozone, though it is not part of the Eurozone.
The use of this degree of firmness is the only way to send a message to the British to let them know that they have more to lose by exiting the Union than their partners: most of their commercial and financial exchanges are with the continent and thanks to the Union.
So, worthy heirs of the “nation of shopkeepers”, according to the formula Bernard Shaw attributed one day to Napoleon, the British will make their calculations, and they will stay.